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On the reform of the law of homicide
L. H. LEIGH

Both in Ehgland
and, my limited reading suggests in India, reform of
the law of homicide is a matter of contemporary
concern. Some years ago,
V. Balasabrahmanyan
deplored the vagueness of the Indian Penal Code provisions
relating to homicide, and the subtleties which have marked their interpretation.'
Equally, in England today, the evident want of a clear rationale for the law of
homicide, together with a lack of precision in the definition of so hasic a concept as
intention, has led the Criminal Law Revision Committee to propose rdorms and has
led to the creation of a Select Committee of the House of Lords to inquire into the
law. And, in truth, the rationale of the law of homicide with two brilliant exceptions,
remains largely unexplored.2 In what follows, I shall endeavour, in a modest way, to
address issues from that basic perspective. In doing so, I shall, perforce, be critical of
a dominant trend
in English penal thought, that of subjectivism. Of course
subjectivism is not the only organising principle around which reformers structure
their proposals. Nor docs existing law stress that as an exclusive value. Much, in my
submission too much, is made to turn, however, on distinctions cast in terms of
definitions of mental states, and too little, perhaps, on other mallers, harm, the
status of the victim, the character of the actor, and the implications of these matters
for sentencing. When we do venture beyond subjectivism, endeavouring as in parole
to attach consequences to other aspects of the crime, we often seem to do so ad
homillem.
Our thought has become locked into a pattern from which, perhaps,
comparative law may suggest helpful escape routes.
The structure of homicide offences is influenced by several considerations. One
such is the system of procedure. In an adversarial system such as ours a jury cannot
sensibly be expected to investigate the finer nuances of thought in the way that a
continental judge who, generally speaking, asks questions of the accused, can do. We
may be able to ask a jury to conclude whether a person foresaw risk, hut not, to cill.:
but one example from German doctrine, whether the accused reconciled himself to a
particular
result, at least if the notion of reconciliation
is thought to have
psychological overtones other than awareness.
1.
2.

V. Balasabrahmanyan.
'"Homicide" in Essays 011 The Jlldiall Pellal Code (Indian Law Institute.
Delhi. 1962 ).
But see 1. :'v1ichael and H. Wechsler. "Rationalc of the Law of Homicide ". 37 Columbia L. Rc\'.
1261 (1937); G. P. Fletchcr. Rethinkillg Crimillal Law (1978).
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Another relates to the structure of punishment. Our system, with its fIXed
penalty for murder, virtually dictates that a distinction between murder and other
culpable homicides shall be retained and, furthermore, that there shall be no
distinctions within the category of murder. Admittedly, distinctions can be based upon
particular rules relating to parole. The Home Secretary, in 1983, adopted a policy of
restricting the release of murderers of police and prison officers, terrorist murders,
murders during robbery and sadistic or sexual murders of children,' so that such
persons generally serve twenty years imprisonment.3 They do not, however, serve as
bases of distinctions within the statute law. Yet another relevant factor ~slinguistic;
the need which the English Criminal Law Revision Committee felt for a pejorative
term which would identify murder as a particularly serious form of homicide, the
perpetrator of which ought in principle to attract a grave stigma.
The result has been a structure both inelastic and, paradoxically, somewhat
imprecise. Culpable homicide is basically divided into murder and manslaughter, no
formal distinctions being made within the two categories. In their totality they result
in a very wide category of culpable homicide, extending from purpose to kill, the
narrowest category of murder, to manslaughter by unlawful act or by inadvertent
recklessness.4 The coverage thus achieved virtually parallels that achieved by sections
299 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code taken together. The structure is rigid because
the principal discrimen (provocation, diminished responsibility and infanticide apart)
employed to distinguish murder from manslaughter is that of the specification of the
mental element, in the case of murder, intent to kill or to do really serious bodily
harm.5 It is imprecise because courts have always been reluctant to circumscribe
murder narrowly by defining intent in terms solely of purpose. Instead, they have
qualified the mental element with such locutions as that the actor be virtually cerJain
that his actions will produce a given result.6 Even this formulation is of recent
adoption. The speeches of certain members of the House of Lords in Hymn, now
overruled, according to which the mental element for murder consisted in intention-()r
awareness of a substantial degree of probability that a consequence might occur;
rested upon an older formulation of the mental element in murder which was sui
generis, cast in terms neither of intent nor of recklessness as that term had then been
defined in academic writings.7 Interestingly, that wider formulation owed its genesis to
a case of terrorist killing where the accused acted with awareness but not, it would
seem, with the purpose of killing.8 The rule thus enunciated was apt to cover cases of
terrorist killing where a warning, albeit an insufficienj warning, was given by the
accused. It is certainly better adapted to that end than is the modern rule which
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

8.

Hansard, 30 November, 1983. For details, see N. Walker, Sentencing Theory: Law and Practice
(1985) para. 22.64.
On the breadth of these see D.P.P. v. Newbury and Jones (1977) A. C. 500 (unlawful act requiring
only foresight of some harm by a reasonable man) and Kong Cheuk Kwan v. The Queen (1985) 82
Ct. App. R 18 (inadvenent recklessness).
Reg. v. Hancock and Shankland (1986) 2 W.L.R 357; Reg. v. Nedrick (1986) 1 W. L. R 1025; Reg. v.
Cunningham (1981) 73 Cr. App. R 253.

Reg. v. Hancock and Shankland (1986) 2 W.L.R 357; Reg. v. Nedrick (1986) 1 W.L.R 1025.
(1975) A.c. 55.
Reg. v. Desmond (1868) discussed in G. L. Williams. Textbook of Criminal Law ( 1st ed .. 1978 ) at
p. 213; the discussion is not repeated

in the second (1983) edition.
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probably leaves some such cases to be dealt with as manslaughter. This, in the light of
the parole rule just mentioned, is decidedly paradoxical.
.
A recent English Law Commission Report, Codification of TIle Criminal Law, is
faithful to this subjectivist tradition.9 It is worth following this report through simply
because it represents the dominant opinion, academic and professional, of the day.
The proposed definition of murder is cast in terms of intent to 'kill, which includes the
case where the actor knows that death is a virtually certain result of his actions, or
intent to cause serious injury being aware that death may result, or possibly intending
to cause fear of death or serious injury with the same awareness.10 The latter two
mental states may be summed up as encompassing a willingness to risk life.ll It is,
perhaps somewhat narrower than a formulation which accepted that principle fully
would be; the wording is apt to exclude from liability for murder a motorist who
drives rashly, knowing that he might kill another as a result.12 Why this limitation
should be desired is obscure. In most cases the mental element of awareness would be
difficult to prove, but if such awareness could be proven there seems 'little reason why
a motorist should be favoured above one who causes death by, for example,
administering a beating to another. It is, of course, possible that underlying this is a
doubt concerning the integrity of the fact-finding process; a fear that the process of
inference in this context would lead to artificial results.13 To this two points may be
ventured; first that problems of inference arise in contexts other than motoring, and
secondly that the process leads the fact-finder only to a prima facie inference. The
accused may still give evidence to negate it.
'
Manslaughter under the Law Commission's proposals, would comprehend
causing death with the intents required for murder where diminished responsibility,
provocation or the use of excessive force for a lawful object are present. Consistent
with existing law, but more neatly expressed, it is proposed that intoxication be
available to reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter, but not to remove guilt
entirely. Manslaughter also applies where the actor causes death by acts performed
with intent to cause serious injury where the actor does not foresee death, or is
reckless (in the advertent sense) whether death or serious injury will be caused.14
The proposals in the draft Code define diminished responsibility in terms of
mental abnormality which is a substantial enough reason to reduce the offence to
manslaughter.15 Mental abnormality is so defined as arguably' to exclude states of
mind attributable simple to stress. It comprehends mental illness, subnormality,
psychopathic disorder, and any other disorder or disability of mind except
9.
10.

11.

12.
13.

Law Com. 143.
Law Com. No. 143, clause 56.
Indeed, viewed from this perspective, existing law which requires at minimum an intent to do really
serious bodily harm is but an objective proposition concerning risk - taking, and this was also true
of the old felony - murder doctrine as it evolved immediately before 1957, the date of the Homicide
Act.
See per Lord Goff in "The Mental Element In the Crime of Murder" (1988) 104 L.Q.R 30 at p. 52.
This is argued strongly by Sheriff G. H. Gordon, "Subjective and Objective Mens Rea" (1974-5) 17
Cr. L.Q. 355.

14.

15.

Law Com. No. 143, clause 57.
Ibid, clause 58.
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intoxication. No reference to stress as. such occurs in the explanatory notes.
Provocation is defmed in terms consistent with. current law. As such, it does not
require any unlawful act proceeding from the party offering provocation to the person
provoked and thus recognises that the deceased's actions, by subjecting the accused to
stress, may afford him the defence of provocation.l6 In Doughty (which may have been
decided per incuriam) the Courts thus held that the crying of a tiny baby could amount
to provocation so as to oblige the Judge to put the issue of provocation before the
jury.17I find it hard to applaud this. It certainly illustrates that English legal doctrine
responds unevenly to problems posed by emotional stress. The proposition is further
evidenced by the proposals concerning suicide pacts, which admittedly often involve
killings in poignant circumstances. The Criminal Law Revision Committee proposes
to recognise this, not by decriminalising such killings, but by creating a reduced
homicide offence to apply to them. The same body recommends that infanticide_
should be restricted to cases where the woman's mind is disturbed by the effect of
giving birth.ls The Committee intended to exclude cases of child battering. The
infanticide proposal is, within the limit set by the requirement of mental illness widely
drawn, and its critics are surely right to think that courts and psychiatrists will view the
boundaries of mental illness leniently. There can be, surely, no firm line of
demarcation between cases where an individmil reacts badly to stress, and one in
which his reactions can be attributed to mental disturbance. Furthermore, at this level
we can point to another incongruity; Doughty's case holds that the crying of a child
may require the Judge to put provocation before the jury, yet in such a case
infanticide might not be available. It seems clear that no coherent policy unites these
cases.
In terms of the structure of homicide offences, and in particular murder, it may
be thought appropriate to look again at the criteria which should determine whether
conduct falls within the most serious category of homicide and whether, if homicides
are to be graded in terms of culpability, there should not be grading within murder as
the most serious category. I should add that I mean legislative grading, and not
executive determinations which are neither submitted to Parliamentary debate nor
fully reviewable by the courts as is the case in England today under the rubric of
executive decisions on release.
The reasons for gradation would relate both to the sentencing powers of courts,
and to the stigma which it is desired to attach to conduct. In terms of the distinction
between murder and manslaughter, ameliorative provisions like those which relate to
provocation, diminished responsibility and the provisions which relate to the (surely
winecessary) offence of infanticide seem ripe for reconsideration in the light both of
recent case law and of foreign law. To take but one example, discussed in detail
16.
17.

18.

This was ef courSe required by the common law, save in the case of the wife caught in adultery, as
to which see Holmes v. D.P.P. (1946) A.c. 588.
(1986) 83 Cr. App. R 319; d. Reg. v. Ibrams and Gregory (1981) 74 Cr. App. R. 154. The issue
seemingly is whether the mischief rule should be applied to the construction of s. 3 of the
Homicide Act, 1987 so as to require that an act or words in relation to another be implied.
Law Com. No. 143, clauses 65 and 67. For background see Criminal Law Revision Committee, 14th
Report, Offences Against the Person ( Cmnd. 7844 ), para 106.
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below; mercy killing (not euthanasia) has never attracted an overt ameliorative
provision in English law, though it has sometimes been brought in by a humane, but
intellectually insupportable, invocation of diminished responsibility. In other legal
systems, for example Germany it is treated as a reduced homicide, value being given
to the emotional trauma involved.
Can we, then, learn anything from foreign law? Clearly, an excursus into foreign
penal law needs to be conducted circumspectly. Comparative law may lead us to
better solutions where values are held in common, but is unlikely to prove helpful
where they are not. Secondly, foreign legal systems need to be looked at as
autonomous structures. For example, the provisions of a clause defining murder may
have a meaning other than we suppose if the basic defmition of mental states differs
from that _whichwe adopt. It is clear that this is often the case; the definition of
intention in some civil law systems, for example, extends from purpose to awareness
of substantial risk.19 A definition of murder which looks familiar to our eyes might
thus encompass cases which historically we have regarded as cases of manslaughter.
That is not to criticise such a structure but only to remark that we must understand it
accurately if we are to draw lessons from it.
I assume that there will be general agreement that homicide should contin\le to
be graded, probably but not certainly using the traditional nomenclature of murder
and manslaughter.20 The principal reason appears to relate to stigma; whether it is
right that the same stigma should apply to all instances of what would be a widely
defined crime. It may also be thought questionable whether courts should have the
same wide discretion over all instances of such an offence, even Though in fact
sentencing patterns would doubtless emerge. The first question must therefore be
what criteria are to be used in such grading, and secondly, whether if there is to be
grading within the class, what criteria might be employed to that end.
Civilian systems, typically, give murder a wide connotation. This follows from
their view, akin to that strongly held in the House of Lords by Lord Goff, and
espoused in Hyam21 by Viscount Dilhorne and Lord Cross that there is little moral
distinction worth making between a person who proposes to ;'ill, and one who is
prepared to risk life for a purpose which lacks social value.22 Lord Goff would indeed
go farther, into the realms of "wicked recklessness", understanqing by that term the
19.

20.

21.
22.

See for example the discussion in H. H. Jescheck, Tratado De DerecllO Penal, (vol. 1, 1981 ) p. 394433; J. 8. Ramirez and M.V. Bejas, Le Systeme Penal Des Pays De L'Amerique Latine ( ed. Pedone,
1983) which makes reference to German doctrine as well. The same thought underlies the
(abandoned) French Projet de Nouveau Code Penal, ( Dalloz, 1988 ), 121-3.
It is of course true that the New Zealand Criminal Law Reform Committee advocated collapsing
murder and manslaughter into a single offence of culpable homicide, giving a wide sentencing
discretion to the court, but that suggestion has generally not been fa\'oured elsewhere: see Criminal
Law Refoml Committee ( N.Z. ), Report 011 Culpable Homicide (1976). Certainly Lord Goff,"T/g
Melital Eleme/ll in the Crime of Murder", (1988) 104 L.Q.R. 30 assumes that the distinction will
remain.
(1975) AC. 55.
The same value underlies the decision of the Privy Council in Chan Wing-Siu v. The Queen (1985)
AC. 168 which, with respect to contrary opinions, takes what I believe to be a correct position in
terms of social policy. Note, however, that Lord Goff, loco cit. at pp. 48-49 would require awareness
of a risk of death.
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case of the person who does not consciously appreciate at the time when he acts that
there is a possibility that his acts will cause death, but who fails to perceive this
because his mind is in a state of wicked indifference to others. This is, of course, the
characteristic broad approach of Scottish law.
Continental systems would not go quite this far. They tend to treat the most
serious instances of culpable homicide as a crime requiring intention. Such systems
start with basic crime of culpable homicide which can only be committed where the
actor appreciates that his actions may cause death. Typically, culpable homicide i~
then treated as aggravated depending upon circumstances of commission which are
thought to invest the crime with particular gravity, or circumstances relating to the
status of the victim. Intention is widely defined to extend to the case where the actor
appreciates that death may result. Not all systems, however, employ so wide a
definition for the purposes of defining advertent culpable homicide. German law, for
example, apparently requires that the accused have foreseen death as a substantial
possibility. This limiting principle has been adopted for two reasons. The first is that it
is difficult to express precisely what degree of foresight and what attitude to it is
required in cases of mere awareness. The second involves problems of proof; how to
be certain beyond a reasonable doubt that a person actually appreciated a risk where
the probabilities of its occurrence are low. It is interesting that this problem arises in
systems where the accused, though entitled to remain silent, may nonetheless be
asked questions by the ./udge.The particular application of this approach can be seen
in French and German law, but it also appears in Austrian, Spanish and Italian law as
well.
An example is afforded by the French reform proposal which would, fOl
example, treat a person who voluntarily kills another (meaning with the awarenes~
that death may result from his actions) as guilty of murder and liable to a maximum
penalty of 30 years imprisonment.23 A lesser homicide offence comprehends death
caused by imprudence (in effect particularly blameworthy inadvertence), inattention
and negligence, especially by a failure to take precautions.24 Distinctions within
murder are made according to objective criteria discussed below. German law is not
dissimilar; the most serious cases fall within Mord (murder essentially for greed, or
from sexual motives, or by ambush or stemming from a particularly vicious
disposition), the less grave fall within Totschlag (which is the basic category of
culpable homicide); and the actor must in all cases have viewed death as a serious
possibility.25
For my part, I too cannot believe that there is a distinction worth making
between one whose purpose is to kill, and one who, acting for no socially valuable
23.
24.

Projet de Nouveau Code Penal, article 221 - 1.
Ibid, article 221 - 8; the proposed maximum penalty was three years
mental

states in existing French law, see G. Stefani,
General ( 11 ed. 1983 ), para. 232 ff.
25.

G. Levasseur

imprisonment.
On these
and B. Bouloc, Droit Penal

A. Fromont et A. Rieg, Inll'oduction Au Droit AI/emond, (1984 ) Vol. 11, p. 268. The Criminal Code
of the German Democratic Republic has a somewhat different list, which does however single out
imer alios recidivist killings and particularly brutal killings as falling within the most serious
categOlY·
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purpose, adverteiltly risks life.26 That certainly is the continental view. Common law
reform proposals are commonly somewhat narrower than this. The Law Commission
proposals require an intent to cause serious injury coupled with awareness as to death.
The Law Reform Commission of Canada requires a purpose to kill which is defined to
include consequences which the actor does not desire but which he knows are implicit
in his course of conduct. The formulation is thus narrower than that of the English
Law Commission.27 The Canadian formulation is radical; that of the Law Commission
is merely cumbersome. The nub of the latter is, surely the awareness that death may be
caused and it is difficult to see why an intent to cause serious injury should be required as
a limitation, at any rate in a system which recognises (or should recognise) that certain
cases of awareness will not be criminal simply because the law allows a recognised
social value to negate culpability, as indeed it does in the case of recklessness and, in
relation to intention, in certain cases of accelerating death. We may take two examples.
A surgeon who performs a risky operation
in order to save life will not be liable
criminally if the patient dies. He would be so liable had he performed the operation for
purely sadistic reasons. A doctor who prescribes drugs for the relief of pain, knowing
that such drugs will inevitably shorten life, is not liable for murder when death occurs.28
If, however, it is thought that the differentiating factor between murder and
other homicides ought to be cast in terms of the mental element, the Canadian
proposal is surely worth considering. In no case would a person be convicted of
murder unless he at least knew that the death of another was a certain outcome of his
actions. Again with deference to contrary opinions, I do not believe that the word
"virtually" as employed by the English Law Commission in defining intention has
merit. If it is meant to preserve a certain latitude of appreciation, it suggests simply
that the authors are not sufficiently convinced of their own premises to state them in
an unqualified form. It would follow, however, that certain bad cases of killing,
including but not restricted to terrorist outrages, would fall within manslaughter only.
If, following some foreign systems, murder were to be defined broadly, one
would have to consider whether it would be desirable to indicate some instances of
the offence as of particular gravity. The purpose to be served would be that of
ensuring that particularly heinous instances of murder would receive a more severe
sentence than the simple crime of murder wQuld do. This consideration can be
advanced independent of whether the courts are given a general sentencing discretion
in murder or not, for it can in any event be regarded as a guide to sentencing practice
and as an indication of the stigma with which the particular type of murder is
regarded. In brief, such a provision could appear logically in a system which granted a
general sentencing discretion, or which singled out a basic crime of murder in respect
of which such a discretion would be granted but started with a. presumptively fixed
26.

27.

28.

TIle American Law Institute, Model Penal Code, (1962) section 210.2 is also cast in terms of risking
life. TIle drafting again seems unnecessarily cumbersome, speaking as it does of circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to human life, and indicating participation
in certain crime as
presumptively manifesting such extreme indifference.
Law Reform Commission of Canada, Recodifying Criminal Law (Report No. 30, 1986) draft clauses
2(4)(b) and 6(3); the Commissioners are not unanimous in the recommendation,
some wishing to
retain reckless killing as murder.
See further Helen I3eynon, "Doc/ors As Murderers", (1982) Crim. L.R. 17.
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sentence in the case of aggravated murders or in a system which fixed different maxima
for basic and aggravated murders. Such a distinction would also preserve some deterrent
force to inhibit subsequent killings by the same accused; for example the killing of a
prison officer or another prisoner. Admittedly, while a parole system lasts recidivism
could be and doubtless would be met as it now is, by imposing restrictions on parole.
These, if expressed in law instead of being left to unfettered executive discretion would at
least be consistent with the principle of legality. The attempt to single out cases as particularly blameworthy is of course redolent of the American habit of grading murder
into degrees. Such a gradation is also suggested for Canada, albeit in terms of first
degree murder and murder notwithstanding the narrow definition of murder there
advocated. It is found also in the French proposals, being necessitated, surely, by the
wide definition which the proposal employs. It :s, however, not of crucial importance
and there are obvious difficulties in singling out the murder of certain classes of victim as
graver than others or as requiring graver punishment, even on utilitarian grounds. There
is, I think, a case for singling out certain recidivist killings, but it is not of fundamental
importance. In particular, if a discretionary life sentence were fIXed as the maximum for
all murders, courts could be trusted to assess sentence in the light of the relevant facts.
Assuming that it is desired to make distinctions within a broad category of
murder, the question arises in what terms such distinctions should be made, whether
the criteria for distinction appear defensible (which at least relates both to their
nature and to the closeness with which they can be defined), and whether making the
distinction serves a valid social purpose, the latter involving issues of value judgment
rather than of technical competence.
Certain entries are commonly found
in lists of aggravating circumstances.
Among these are: premeditated murder (at le'ast where premeditation
is not a
response to emotional stress), murder accompanied by torture, murder by means of
which more than one person may be killed, or murder for the purpose of facilitating
another offence or concealing it.29 Other entries are less commonly found, for
example, those which focus on the status of the victim. The French draft singles out
murder of the young, infirm, or very old as particularly heinous. It also would protect
judges and police officers, inter alia, in this way. The Canadian draft singles out
terrorist and political murders as falling within the more severe category. It also
singles out murders c.ommitted in the course of certain specified offences, for example
during the course of robbery, hijacking, confinement or sexual assault. Canadian law
at present makes more severe parole provision in respect of the killing of peace
officers, including prison officers. The draft, consistent with its emphasis on activity
and motive rather than listing offences and victims, protects peace officers by placing
within the more severe category murder for the purpose of furthering an offender's
escape. Similarly, as we have seen, some of these entries guide parole policy in
England by way of executive fiat.
29.

See Projel de NOI/I'eal/ Code Penal, Article 221-2-221-5; Law Reform Commission of Canada, op. cil.
clause 6(4). The formulation in the Model Penal Code, as already noted, treats acts done in the
course of certain other offences as presumptively manifesting extreme indifference to human life,
but this is for the purpose of defining murder as such, and is unhappily evocative of the old felony murder rule.
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For those who are minded to follow such a route, the pu22le is to know which
matters should be regarded as warranting an indication that they be more severely
punished than the norm. For example, if one treats certain instances as instances of
particularly bad character, one will single them out as deserving graver punishment
than the generality of killings. But if one thinks thus, one must be clear that the
circumstances of the offence do bear this connotation. As Michael and Wechsler point
out, premeditation does not necessarily imply particularly bad disposition. One may
rely on deterrence. Clearly, it would be defensible on deterrent grounds to place
murders which involve attacks on peace officers in the more serious category. Clearly
also, for reasons of stigma, murders involving torture could be so place(,t.Terrorist
murders might give rise to different considerations. Not all premeditated murders
would, one supposes, necessarily fall within the more serious category. Nor would
political murders. Nor would premeditated political murders. The status of the victim
would not universally seem relevant. The choice is one of values and would, inevitably,
reflect political compromises. I would not venture down this route if a discretionary
life penalty were retained for murder. If a lesser penalty were provided for murder
generally, then my own opinion, for what it is worth, would single out murders
committed for the purpose of concealing a crime or furthering the escape of an
offender from detection, arrest or conviction, and murders accompanied by torture. I
believe on balance and notwithstaading the difficulties with lists which I have earlier
noted that under such a regime a deterrent expressed in terms of a sentence imposed
by a court to a maximum of life imprisonment should be available to protect peace
officers including prison officers. I should be reluctant to extend the list further.
German doctrine apparently fmds difficultywith the specific action of the aggravating
features and many German lawyers believe the elaborate capitulation of aggravating
features to be unnecessary. Furthermore, I would suggest that any more severe
penalty made available for aggravated homicides be regarded as a maximum. It might,
for example, appear that the killing of a prison officer was a response to an
intolerable prison regime. The imposition of a mandatory penalty might appear
unjust in such a case. Again, a flexible structure of this character is employed in
continental systems.

II
Hitherto, we have looked at the serious category of culpable homicide and the
structure of liability and punishment which ought to apply to those cases which
incontestably fall within it. Other matters bear upon the mitigation of punishment,
either by recognising them as grounds for mitigation within the context of sentencing
discretion, or by assigning them to a lesser offence category. Mercy killing is one such.
One feature of the Canadian draft and of German, Swiss and Norwegian law is that
mercy killingywhile regarded as murder, falls within the catego~ of ordinary murder
and therefore is not subject to a fIXed penalty.30In this way, both the effect of
30.

---

A convenient summary in English is contained in Law Refonn Commission of Canada, Euthanasia,
Aiding Suicide and Cessation of Treatmenl, Working Paper 28 (1982) pp. 24 - 26; none of the
systems under review pennitted voluntary euthanasia See al$o, for Gennany, M. FIQrnont et A.
Rieg, Introduction Au Droit Allemand (I'ome 11) p.296.

------------_

...--

-------------------

----------.----
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emotional stress and the gravity of the homicide are recognised. Furthermore,
under German law, where a person kills a sufferer at that person's persistent
request, the crime is regarded as a reduced homicide and subject to a
maximum of five years imprisonment. Other ways of arriving at this result can
of cour.se be suggested. The French Pro jet arrives at the same result by first
imposing only a maximum penalty for simple murder and then by permitting
the court to take into account when sentencing both the effect of temporary
psychological disturbance which is not severe enough to bring the insanity
defence into play, and stress. The French draft defines a concept of diminished
responsibility
broadly though it still requires that it be pathological. Stress,
however, can simply be taken into accou~t in sentencing. There is doubt
whether a separate diminished responsibility provision is really needed; the
French Pro jet proposes to include it because of its forensic appeal to defence
advocates. While the Criminal Law Revision Committee dropped a proposal to deal
expressly with mercy killing, the time is surely ripe to re-assess the matter.
Undoubtedly, there would be widespread opposition to legalising euthanasia but, one
would hope, not to ameliorating the punishments for mercy killing either by creating. a
lesser offence or by granting a general sentencing discretion as a response to
overwhelming emotional stress.3!In this connexion, I am conscious that "mercy killing"
is perhaps the wrong phrase, for I do not at this juncture wish to argue that the
essence of the mitigation should refer to motives of compassion on the part of the
actor. I am arguing here that a defence based on stress, analogous to provocation,
should be provided. That is not to say that I would not, on another occasion,
_ refrain from proposing a measure to deal with compassionate killing generally,
but I am not persuaded that the public in Britain at any rate would support such a
measure at present. In favour of the narrower proposal, it may after all be said, first
that some courts now interpret diminished responsibility impermissibly widely to this
end, secondly that certain instances of mercy killing in England and in Europe
generally have historically not been prosecuted though they were known to have
happened commonly, and thirdly thjl.t it is surely inconsistent to recognise one
instance of emotional stress as a partial defence (provocation), but not to
recognise at all the surely less blameworthy reaction of a spouse who, in the
agony of stress, kills the other spouse who is dying in great pain?2 Lady Wootton has
noted that in such cases judges stretch diminished responsibility to include such cases
of agonised rationality, and in France, apparently, juries sometimes refuse to convict
in such cases.33

31.

32.

33.

The law does of course permit a physician to give drugs to alleviate pain and suffering even when
he knows that such administration will shorten life; effect is thus given to therapeutic purpose even
within the context of intent as a fault element. See Reg. v. Adams, (1957) Crim. L.R 365.
On this see Charlotte Bronte, Shirley (Everyman Library cd.) at p. 403; and A. Laingui, Histoire du
Droit Penal, (1985) p. 104, n. 29. In the Netherlands, a public prosecutor of sufficiently high rank
may order that no prosecution be brought in such a case: see Heuni Non-Prosecution In Europe
(Helsinki, 1986), p. 254. In England there seems little doubt that if such a killing were brought to
the attention of the authorities it would be prosecuted. Some cases are doubtless, hushed up.
B. Wootton, Crime and Penal Policy, (1978) p. 143. See also S. McCabe, "Is Jury Research Dead" in
M. findlay and r. Duff, The IWY Vnder A"ack, (1988) p. 37. I am indebted to M. Marc Ancel for
observations on the French practice.
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Provocation should, I believe, continue to be recognised as a response to
emotional stress; The alternatives, I believe, are first. to modify provocation in such a
way as to prevent an accused from arguing that he was provoked in a situation where
no one has performed a blameworthy action in respect of him or another (as
happened in DOl,lghty) or to draft a general stress provision which would enable the.
court to take account of stress generally in sentencing.34This would enable certain
egregious cases to be regarded as murder rather than a lesser homicide. A court
might, faced with an inadequate and unstable parent be inclined to pass an unduly
lenient sentence but that, in England thanks to sections 35 and 36 of the Criminal
Justice Act, 1988, can now be corrected by the Court of Appeal.
The English Law Commission reproduces the basic structure of English law
whilst incorporating certain suggestions of the Criminal Law Revision Committee. As
such, it is faithful to the concept of subjective fault, and it takes due account of any
physical or mental disabilities from which the accused suffers. It would be for the jury
to assess the effect of provocation upon the accused in the light of these
characteristics. Unfortunately, perhaps, the question is simply whether the accused
was provoked and not whether the deceased in any way acted, wrol).gly.3SThe
consequence may be the conviction of the accused for a lesser homicide than murder.
This raises questions of stigma; should such a person be regarded as other than a
murderer. It may be thought to raise questions of deterrence in terms of weakening
general perceptions concerning the need for self-restraint in terms of trying situations
in life other than cases of gratuitous and sudden blows and insults offered by another.
Conversely, if a jury rejects provocation in such a case, the court is left without power
to mitigate sentence simply because at present the penalty for murder is fixed and the
facts would fall outside any convenient pigeon hole which the law now provides. These
points raise issues of responses to stress generally, an issue which arises on the
English law of self-defence as well. This is not a topic which has ever been considered
in a unified fashion. Should we consider a single provision according to stress the
office of either a general or, more probably a partial defence? Or is this a mere
chimera? If stress generally is not to give rise to even a qualified defence, the question
of provocation is surely removed from its true context, that of punishment, to an
inappropriate context, that of guilt.36
The French Projet deals with the problem by permitting a court to take into
account generally, for the purpose of sentence, trouble psychique, a doubtless
purposely broad term, but one which requires a pathological base. A court could in
any event take account of emotional stress generally in sentencing. There is an
important limitation to this in the French Projet; murder of the old, infirm and young
would be considered aggravated murders and would attract a penalty of life
imprisonment rather than a thirty year maximum sentence. This is, however, regarded
34.
35.

36.

The case of the adulterous spouse would have to be specially provided for.
The notion that the deceased must actwrongfully towards the accused was required at common
law; it appears also in certain European systems which recognise provocation,. e.g. Belgium, as to'
which see Constant, Manuel De Droit Penal Vol. 1. para. 494.
In a common law context, these points are recognised in Criminal Law Reform Committee (New
Zealand), Repon on Culpable Homicide, (1976).
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as a maximum sentence which may be reduced by reference to mitigating circumstances.
In this French law and that of many other European countries coincide. The Canadian
draft does not seem to mention provocation. It would thus simply be relevant to sentence.
These latter ways of dealing with the problem (by a stress provision going to
definition of defences or to sentence) are, in my submission, more satisfactory than
adherence to the present structure. If a person acts with awareness that he is risking
life which, after all, on any view seems to be the lowest common denominator of
culpable homicide, the least unsatisfactory solution is, in my submission, to ~nvict
him of murder while giving the court adequate discretion in sentencing. I would,
however, insist that the situation present a substantial risk of death and that the actor
be aware of this. If there is a doubt about the integrity of the process of drawing
inferences it will surely occur at a level of. possibility below this. Furthermore,
a
general proVision con~rning
emotiQnal stress could, with advantage, be made
generally applicable in a Criminal Code, at any rate if the courts are not simply to be
given a sentencing discretion. It would enable courts to deal adequately with such
difficult emotional problems as pre-menstrual
tension?7 It may be thought that
immature persons who kill, for example, should in some cases be held liable for a lesser
offence of manslaughter. Here, the argument revolves around stigma. In my submission,
the stigma to attach to the crime can be adequately catered for in the sentence.
Some of the themes with which I have been dealing are relevant to other defences
as well. The Law Commission in its draft Code mentions excessive self-defence because
it would have the effect, on their proposals, of reducing murder to manslaughter. The
accused's belief that the force which he used was not excessive would reduce the crime
to manslaughter . Value is presumably to be given both to the fact that the acc~ed
believed himself to'be acting for a lawful purpose and that he was using only necessary
force. The former consideration serves to mark. out the case as distinct from, say,
provocation and can readily justify moving the homicide into a lesser category. This is to
follow the route once taken and now abandoned by the Australian courts.38 Emotional
stres~ can be catered for in sentence. The fundamental question must be, however,
whether it is right for example to convict an hysteric, or a person in a situation of
stress, who misapprehends the amount of force which is reasonable, of a homicide
offence. In English law the rules are almost wilfully complicated. In determining
whether the accused was entitled to act in self-defence the jury must act on the view
of the facts which it believes the accused entertained. The enquiry is, to this extent,
subjective. The court must then ask, however, whether on the accused's hypothesis as to
fact, the force which he used was reasonable. The test on this limb becomes objective.39
.M6st systems answer the question whether value is to be given to the accused's
motive in the affirmative.40 I take it that the reasoning is partly symbolic (to emphasise

37.

See e.g. British Medkal Journal, Saturday, 24 March, 1973.

38.

Zecevicv. D.P.P.(1987) 61 A.LJ.R. 375.

39.
40.

Palmer v. The Queen (1971) 1 W.LR. 831;Reg. v. Whyte (1987) as Cr. App. R. 183.
E.g. Law Reform Commission of Canada, op. cit. clause 3(10); Projet de Nouveau COde Pena~
article 122-4; but the Model-Penal Code, section 3.04 does not contain a requirement of
proponionality, ~~ntly ~ng
it to th~j\lry to \Je:te:nnine:wbe:thc:rthe: accusc<Jin fact acte<Jin the
belief that such force was necessary.
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the value put on human life) and partly educational"(to ensure that society:will
generally accept that great care must be taken before so acting as to endanger
life). Individual deterrence would hardly seem appropriate in the circumstances.
There is, however, surely much to be said for the Model Penal Code formulation
which, albeit cast in complicated terms, would leave to the jury the questions
whether the actor acted for reasons the validity of which the law recognises
and genuinely believed that the force which he used was reasonably necessary
for the purpose. If the prosecution failed to negate both propositions the
accused would be acquitted. The reasonableness of the force used would be weighty
evidence on the issue whether the accused truly acted in self-defence, or for other,
unjustifiable motives. In effect, if not in terms, this reflects the present state of
.
English law.41
I now turn to lesser homicides, some of which might in any reconsideration of
the law, be subsumed under a sentencing discretion. Foreign law suggests that it is
unnecessary to continue to have a special category of infanticide. That crime came
into law in order to prevent the imposition of the death penalty upon a mother who, in
a state of emotional anguish, killed her baby. The specific medical premises upon
which it depends have long since been shown to be unsound.~2This is admitted by the
authors of the Law Commission draft who couch it in terms of mental disturbance by
reason of the effect of giving birth or of circumstances consequent upon that birth.
The latter formulation is of course very wide. Two aspects of this trouble me. First,
the maximum penalty would be five years. How will this relate to maxima for other
cases in which imbalance caused by stress is present? Secondly, should the category of
victim be a factor in the reduction of the crime? If so, should not this affect
mercy killing so as to move it into a lower category? We are after all talking
in both cases about stress in the family, a setting in which it can be extremely
difficult, without help, either to escape from or mitigate it. Conversely, if the
material factor is simply stress, there is no need to move the killing of an infant into a
lower category. The case can be catered for by a general sentencing discretion. 43
Finally, if the issue is one of stress, should not this apply to the killings by a
mother of a child other than her youngest child or in some cases to the killing of
another's children? As Nigel Walker remarks, such killings by depressed mothers are
not uncommon.44
There seems general agreement in common law systems that the survivor of a
suicide pact ought to continue to be liable for homicide, albeit not for murder or
manslaughter. This is the solution suggested by law reform bodies in England, Canada
41.

42.
43.

44.

Reg. v. U?lyte (1987) 8S Cr. App. R. 283 where the instinctual action of the accused is said to be the
best evidence of what the situation objectively requires - sed quaere; what is reasonable in self-

d.efence depends on the nature of the attack and the imminence of danger, and the accused's
perceptions of these are taken into account.
E.g. ·Puerperal psychosis· or ·lactational insanity": see Nigel Walker, Crime and1nsanity in England(Edn., 1982), Vol. 1 Chap. 7.
Contemporary German law treats'infanticide as .• le5ser homjcide, punishable with from 6 months
to 5 years imprisonment. The victim .must have been an illegitimate child. This does not seem to
offer advantages over English law: see Froniont et Rieg, op. cit. p. 296..
N. Walker, op. cit. p. 135.
'
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and New Zealand, and corresponds to the solution in German law as well. Such a
solution appears in clauses. 65 and 66 of the Law Commission Draft Code, and also in
the Canadian proposals.45 In both, the existing structure which treats the offence as
manslaughter is abandoned. The justification most commonly advanced is that
without· the ministrations of those who are prepared to help another to commit
suicide, the person concerned, who may well be in a vulnerable mental state, might
well recover from his suicidal frame of mind.46 Both here and in New Zealand the
view has been expressed that criminal liability in such cases is pointless, at any rate on
deterrent grounds, and inhumane. That view has not, however, won general
acceptance. Such an argument is, obviously, apt to raise the entire question of
euthanasia. Such an inquiry would obviously be far-reaching and would have to be
addressed de lege ferenda since euthanasia is not generally permitted in Western
systems of law.47
I come finally to cases which presently fall within the English law of
manslaughter. Which of these should come within a homicide structure and why?
English law at present permits a conviction for manslaughter where either the accused
performs a lawful act which reasonable persons would recognise poses a risk of some
harm, and the victim dies, or where the actor is reckless in performing a lawful act or
omitting to act, with the same fatal result. The case law is somewhat confusing, but we
may note that on the former limb, a person may be convicted of a homicide offence
where neither he nor the reasonable man could have been expected to foresee that his
acts might result in death. On the latter limb because recklessness in modern English
law comprehends cases of particularly blameworthy inadvertence, a person may again
be liable for a homicide offence where he failed to appreciate the risk involved.48 The
Law Commission's Draft Code contains a complicated structure for manslaughter
which would cover the case of a person who kills another while intending to cause
serious injury but unaware that death may result, or who acts recklessly as to whether
death or serious injury will result. For the purposes of the draft, recklessness would
require advertence. The result would be to remove from culpable homicide causing
death by an act of gross inadvertence.
Both existing English law (and section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code) and the
Law Commission's draft raise fundamental issues of policy. In brief, if one accepts
that it is right as a matter of policy to punish certain instances of inadvertence, one
must equally conclude that existing English law incorporates that value imperfectly. In .
brief, while the latest cases make clear that a person who fails to appreciate a risk
when he should have done so, or who, whilst appreciating a risk, shows a high degree
of carelessness in the means which. he chooses to extricate himself from risk are
reckless and so punishable, the same cannot be said of the person who considers
whether a risk exists and who, by an insupportably careless process of reasoning, rules
45.
46.

47.
48.

L.RC. of Canada, 0p. cit. pp. 56-7.
L.Re. of Canada, op. cir.; Criminal Law Revision Committee, (New Zealand) Repon on Culpable
Homicide, (1976), p. 43; the (English) Criminal Law Revision Committee, 14th Report, Offences
Against The ferson, (1980) para 132 speaks of protecting V\I1nerablepe~ons.
I am informed that the Netherlands are considering a law reform measure in this area.
On this see Kong Cheuk Kwan v. The Queen (1985) 82 Cr. App. R 18 and cases cited therein.
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it out.49 The English courts consider such a person not to be reckless. Yet this hardly
responds to any'social policy which might be used to justify liability for inadvertence.
If one accepts that inadvertence is punished for educational reasons (and deterrence
though hardly applicable in this context is surely but a series of crude propositions.
concerning learning theory) it cannot be said that carelessness in ruling out a risk
stands on a footing different from that of failing to appreciate a risk.S(Even if ones'
premises are tinctured by morality, it seems difficult to contend that one but not the
oth~r case can be taken as evidencing wicked disregard for others.
Can we, in any event, justify maintaining inadvertence as a fault element whether
in relation to homicide or more generally in the criminal law? Eminent writers have
thought not. To Jerome Hall, any such liability would reflect the impossible
proposition that there can be degrees of blankness in the human mind.51 This rather
overlooks that the essence of grossness lies not in the mind of the offender but in
ascribed blameworthiness, the criteria of ascription bei,:,g the obviousness and
seriousness of the danger. To others liability for inadvertence cannot be justified on
grounds of deterrence, and if not idle, it is 3.t any rate an excessive use of criminal
punishment to inculcate attitudes of care into individuals. To Glanville Williams,
liability for negligence may be justified in some instances, but not so as to render a
person liable for serious and stigmatic offences.52 .
I would agree that a widely applicable rule of inadvertent recklessness ought not,
on policy grounds, to be imported into the criminal law, though widespread liability of
that character is found in civil law systems and in the Law Reform Commission of
Canada's reform proposals.53 To require all persons to be careful in their daily lives
under pain of criminal punishment should they act otherwise would be to place an
intolerable burden on them. One would have to behave like that reputed medieval
French King who, believing himself to be an egg, conducted himself very carefully
indeed.
I do, however, believe that confined whether by custom or legislation to
particular situations of risk, liability for inadvertence can perform an educative
function.54 I should make it clear that any rule of liability which might be adopted
should take account of the actor's mental capacities or lack of them. A principal
criticism of current English doctrine concerning inadvertent recklessness is that the
Judges refuse to take account of a person's mental capacity in determining whether to
ascribe recklessness to him.55 Confined in the way which I have suggested I' believe
that liability for inadvertence can perform a useful educative function. One can expect
it to work by social reception. In relation to firearms, motor vehicles, and medical
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See Kong Cheuk Kwan v. The Queen, supra, and in particular Lord Roskill's treatment of Andrews v.
D:P.P. (1937) A.c. 576.
On deterrence and learning theory, see J. Gorecki,A Theory of Criminal Justice, (1979) Chapter 1.
Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law, (2 ed., 1960).
G.L. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (2 ed. 1983) p. 94.
Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report No. 30, Recodifying Criminal Law, (Vol. 1, 1986) draft
clauses 6 (1) (negligent homicide), 7(2) (harm by negligence).
See further H.LA. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, (1968) Chap. VI.
Elliou v. C. (1983)
Cr. App. R 103; cr. however, Reg. v. Sheppard
significance of which in this particular may have been overlooked.
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malpractice, the classic cases which, historically, have been prosecuted in common law
systems, there is surely social awareness that these present obvious dangers and there
is no reason to suppose that the historic liability for manslaughter has not played
some part in this awareness. A rule expressed only in terms of advertence would
acquit someone whose conduct indicated an utter disregard for the safety of others. If
a jury were in doubt on the issue of awareness, and in some of these cases it could be
difficult to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused actually foresaw the
precise danger,' such a person would necessarily be acquitted. In my submission, such
a result would be undesirable. We may not be able to make individuals more sensitive,
but we can surely diffuse the message that certain conduct, which presents obvious
dangers, may be criminally punished if these accrue.56
This mode of thinking is reflected in the criminal laws of European systems
where there is wide liability for inadvertent recklessness; that is, for instances where
the actor's conduct manifests indifference to life. Such indifference may be thought to
reflect a particular psychological attitude towards the welfare of others. The penalty is
typically quite low. In German law the maximum is five years imprisonmep.t, whilst
under the French proposal three years imprisonment is suggested.57Only in rare cases
would the penalty approach the maximum. The structure seems appropriate to
maintain the social message involved whilst not punishing careless persons with undue
severity.58
It would indeed be possible to go farther and punish simple negligent homicides
as a Canadian reform proposal envisages. Unfortunately, the report does not argue
the case for a negligence offence. The existing Canadian Criminal Code has a sec.tion
which penalises negligence in the performance of a legal obligation which results in
bodily harm to another, but it has seldom been \lsed and the legislative history does
not indicate why it was introduced.59 This pattern of non-use suggests that prosecutors
are not astute to invoke the provision and that both its justice and its necessity may be
doubted. It is surely e!lough to limit liability by requiring fault of the gravity needed to
constitute inadvertent recklessness.

III
Where, then, might the considerations embodied in these pages take us, and
what rationale may be said to underly them? I believe that the law ought to embody a
serious category called culpable homicide. Within this category I would place cases
where the actor realises that his acts imply a serious possibility that death may result
as well as those cases in which it is his purpose to cause death. I would not extend the
category of culpable homicide to all cases where death is foreseen as a possibility,
althQugh I recognise that there is a strong logical case for doing so, particularly where
56.
57.
58.

In this vein see New Zealand Criminal Law Reform Committee, 0p. cit.
Code Penal, Articles 221-8; Fromont et Rieg,op. cit. p. 297.
Note that continental systems go much wider in this vein than liability for homicide, punishing both
acts and omissions to act where there is a negligent breach of duty. This leads to tortuous
arguments about causation in an attempt to limit liability; see C. Hennau-Hublet, L'Activite
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the actor cannot point to any social value attached to his acting to which the law ought
to give value. My reluctance to extend the most serious category to all these instances
is that I am troubled about the integrity of the fact-finding process where, objectively,
no more can be said than that a reasonable person ought to have appreciated that the
conduct in question could pose a risk of death. I do not see any appreciable moral
distinction between a person who, for no valid social purpose proposes to take.life and
one who knows that he risks life; the limit which I espouse is pragmatic. Within
culpable' homicide I should be prepared for deterrent reasons to provide a heavier
maximum for certain homicides, for example the killing of prison officers. I would, as
noted, give the court a wide measure of discretion in sentencing, simply to take
account of those nuances of moral fault which cannot adequately be catered for by an
abstract rule.
I would preserve as a lesser category of homicide those cases spanning the
spectrum of fault from recognition that death is a possible result of conduct to failure
to recognise an obvious risk of death. Here, liability for homicide can rest upon a risk
principle, but that principle ought to be limited to cases where the consequence of
death is fairly foreseeable.
As for circumstances which now excuse guilt, at least partially, and which are
based on stress, the alternatives seem to me to involve either the enactment of lesser
offences where stress is the ameliorating factor, or the enactment of a 'general
provision giving value to stress,' or the giving of a general sentencing discretion to
courts. Sentencing discretion is easiest to provide for. Its disadvantage is that an
accused may still be found liable for culpable homicide, thus subjecting the accused to
a stigma which may be thought unjust. The same remark may be made concerning a
general stress provision. The enactment of lesser offences enables the legislature to
make moral discriminations of the sort indicated, and it certainly would not preclude
a grant of sentencing discretion as well. It does not of course follow that those matters
which now reduce murder from manslaughter would be dealt with in the same way;
they might simply go to sentence. Mercy killing might, as in Germany, be made a
lesser offence. It is impossible to be sure where a radical enquiry into the law of
homicide would take us.
What is clear is that in England at least only the House of Lords committee
offers the possibility of a radical re-examination, and its terms of reference restrict it
to murder alone. I venture to hope that, whether or not what I have said has
converted you to my view, it has at least suggested other approaches to the structure
of homicide offences than those suggested by prevailing orthodoxy.60

* * * *
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